Social Identities and Political Participation of Immigrants and their Descendants in Europe

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We-ID Identities - Migration - Democracy is a three-year project (2025-2028) that analyses the transformation of individual and collective identities, social cohesion and democracy in the midst of migration, demographic change and current crises in Europe. The consortium includes eight partners: Georg August University of Göttingen, the University of St Andrews in Scotland, the Bocconi University, the Institute for the Study of Population and Human Studies (Bulgaria), the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar (Croatia), Max Planck Society (Population Europe), the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and The Civics Innovation Hub.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction and Background

1.1 Context and Objectives

The aim of this report is to investigate how social identities and political participation of immigrants and their descendants vary in Europe. European countries have experienced increased immigration over the last few decades. Immigrants and their descendants form a quarter of the population in most Northern, Western and Southern European countries; with this share lower but growing in Eastern Europe. Migration has not only increased the social and cultural heterogeneity of European societies, but migrants and ethnic minorities themselves are a diverse group in their characteristics and identities. By studying migrants and their descendants we can better understand wider trends and patterns in cultural, social and political identities, and political participation in European societies; determine factors that promote or hinder migrant inclusion, social integration and cohesion; and develop policies to support heterogeneous population groups in our societies.

1.2 A Brief History of Migration in Europe

In recent decades, European countries have experienced increased immigration streams (Castles & Miller, 2009). While large-scale migration to Northern and Western European countries dates back to the decades directly following WWII, Southern European countries only became an immigration destination region at the turn of the century (González-Ferrer et al., 2017; Kulu et al., 2017). In contrast, Eastern European countries experienced large emigration streams after the fall of Communism and in the following decade (Raymer et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2012). Recently, some Eastern European countries have become immigration destinations, attracting migrants from further east and other parts of the world. This so-called 'migration transition' from emigration to immigration is a response not only to labour market needs, increased wages and living standards, but is also due to the reception of war refugees (Okolski, 2012).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted the mass movement of people within Europe as refugees fled Ukraine (Kulu et al., 2023). This displacement of Ukrainians has resulted in refugees dispersed across Europe, with most concentrated in neighbouring countries. As of mid-2025, the UN estimates that Poland and Germany have received the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over a million individuals recorded in each country (UNHCR, 2025). There has also been an increase in migration from the rest of the world to Europe, with conflict and political instability important drivers of migration to Europe in recent years, with war and violence in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan resulting in increased migration into the EU.

Much migration research has investigated immigrant and ethnic minority economic and social integration in Europe inspired by the notions of assimilation and segmented assimilation – the debate between the ideas of convergence and divergence (Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes et al., 2009; Suárez & Hannikainen, 2025). This study investigates how social identities and political participation of migrants and their descendants vary in European countries. We use data from the European Social Survey. This large-scale data set allows us to examine the responses of migrants across a range of European countries, and also distinguish between migrant generations, comparing migrants and their descendants. We will first provide an overview of research on integration of migrants and minorities. We will then describe the ESS data: the sample size and key variables including migrant status. We will thereafter present results on the social identities and political participation of immigrants and their

descendants in Europe including feelings of identity and belonging, perceptions of discrimination, and political attitudes and engagement.

1.3 Theoretical Background

There is a large social science literature to study immigrants and their descendants in Europe. Much research has used the framework of assimilation and segmented assimilation to explain observed patterns, similarities or differences to the native population (native-born with two native-born parents) (Alba & Nee 2003; Portes et al. 2009). The notions of socialisation and adaptation have been popular in demographic and sociological studies to explain partnership and childbearing behaviour of migrants and their descendants (Kulu et al., 2019). The socialisation approach argues that preferences formed early in life and shaped by the social environment during youth play an important role in family formation decisions in the destination country after migration. In contrast, the adaptation theory argues that over time immigrants' behaviour will converge to the behaviour of the native population. The behaviour of recently arrived immigrants, especially from countries, which differ greatly from the host society in social norms, and behaviour is expected to differ more from the behaviour of the native population than that of the early arrivals (Kulu et al., 2019).

In addition to understanding behaviours and preferences related to life events and family building, the socialisation and adaptation framework can be fruitful to understand how migrants negotiate their identity, build a sense of belonging following arrival in their host country and participate in political institutions.

Socialisation

Identities are formed through social interactions with others, with social and cultural norms are learned and internalised during childhood and within families, communities and educational settings (Crisogen, 2015; Richardson, 1982; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). When moving from one country to another people are expected to keep the values, beliefs and norms which were formed during their childhood, which will also largely shape their behaviour in the new country. Socialisation can also influence identity formation for descendants of migrants. While the children of migrants may have been born in the host country, they remain connected with their parents' country of birth through familial connections. Previous research distinguishes between socialisation which occurs within families (primary socialisation) and socialisation which occurs outside of the family (secondary socialisation) in places such as schools, friend groups and through the media (Crisogen, 2015; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This differentiation is important to consider when studying the identity and sense of belonging among migrant descendants. Familial connections, particularly parents, can influence the identity of the second generation through cultural transmission (Bisin & Verdier, 2011; Vermeulen & Kranendonk, 2021). Parents may use cultural transmission as a means of cultural preservation, through language, religion, food and cultural traditions (Caneva & Pozzi, 2014). This socialisation occurring within the household plays a key role in early identity formation and can pass cultural traditions and values prominent in the parents' country of origin to their children (Schönpflug, 2001).

Cultural transmission can also be used by parents strategically to help their children succeed within the host country. This may involve instilling values and cultural norms which they feel will aid social mobility and prevent assimilation into the negative aspects of the host society culture e.g. alcohol consumption (Tatum & Browne, 2019). This selective acculturalisation acts as a method of cultural maintenance and as a protective measure against undesirable or harmful lifestyles (Portes & Rivas,

2011). As well as using cultural transmission as a way to protect children from perceived negative behaviours, some migrant parents will also encourage their children to assimilate with other aspects of the host society. Actively encouraging children to engage with majority culture can be a strategy employed by migrant parents to aid social mobility and educational achievement, as well as protection against discrimination and marginalisation (Rothe et al., 2010; Loh et al., 2024).

While kinship socialisation may be an important factor in children's identity formation, secondary socialisation occurring outside of the family will also shape cultural and social norms. These secondary sources of socialisation may reflect the norms of the majority culture in the country and could differ from those experienced at home (Brubaker, 2001; Baumert et al., 2024). The children of migrants may therefore experience potentially competing sources of socialisation. This process of dual socialisation may result in internal conflict for the children of migrants, particularly if parents' conservative values clash with more liberal values found in the host country (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018). Despite possible conflicts, dual identities (or biculturalism) have been found to be beneficial among second generation migrants, encouraging feelings of acceptance both in the host society and with their families, migrant communities and parents' country or origin. By adopting elements of both the host country culture and their heritage culture, the descendants of migrants can forge their own identity, a process which aids integration and avoids both marginalisation and cultural bereavement (Berry, 1997; Bhugra, 2004; Sánchez Guerrero & Schober, 2021).

Adaption

The adaptation approach assumes that over time migrants gradually adopt the culture of the host society or majority group while abandoning norms, traditions and practices associated with their culture of origin. Some research makes a difference between assimilation and integration with the latter meaning that migrants simultaneously adopt new cultural practices and preserve elements of their heritage (Abdulhamed & Lonka, 2025; Berry, 1997). Due to the ongoing nature of identity formation and adaptation, we may expect that feelings of belonging and perceptions of their lives in the host country would change over time. This may be influenced by both an increase in social connections and weakening links to the country of origin. While newly arrived migrants may struggle to adapt and therefore suffer lower rates of physical and emotional wellbeing, over time, migrants adapt to the host society with attitudes beliefs becoming more similar to those of the majority population.

Parents' own identity and adaption outcomes can also influence their children. Children of immigrants may grow up under the influences of mainstream society and are thus influenced by the norms and behaviours of the native population. They thus exhibit preferences and behaviours that are similar if not identical to those of the native population (Kulu et al., 2019). Degree of adaptation is not only a product of the choices and behaviours of migrants themselves but also of external factors. Discrimination and prejudice are barriers which migrant groups may face upon arrival in the host country and can have a detrimental effect on migrants' ability to adapt and integrate into the host society (Werkuyten & Nekuee, 1999; Te Lindert et al., 2008; Tyrberg, 2024). Adaptation and identity negotiation are both driven by socialisation and ongoing contact with the majority population. Should these interactions be negative, migrants may seek to avoid social contact with the majority population, resulting in marginalisation and social isolation (Lincoln et al., 2021).

As well as hindering adaptation, prejudice can also influence a sense of belonging. A sense of belonging among migrants is important at both an individual and societal level. For immigrants themselves, discrimination and social exclusion has been linked to adverse health outcomes, with barriers to integration associated with increased levels of stress and poor physical and mental health (Szaflarski & Bauldry, 2019; Albarello et al., 2023). At a societal level, it has been argued that within multicultural societies, a sense of belonging or shared national identity among migrants and the native population is essential for cohesion and acts as a 'glue' which can hold diverse societies together (Miller & Ali, 2014; Tyrberg, 2024). Without this shared sense of identity, societies are likely to experience polarisation within the population (Tyrberg, 2024).

Identity and Religiosity

Religion can form a key part of an individual's identity through traditions, practices and relationships with others. Religion and religious communities can act as a support system during challenging periods in an individual's life, as well as instilling a sense of belonging, all of which can support migrants following arrival in the host country. Religious beliefs and communities can play a key role in the adaptation of migrants. However, the influence that religion has on acculturalisation may vary by denomination. For individuals whose religious beliefs align closely with those dominant in the host society (Christian, in the case of most countries in Europe), can have a positive effect on integration. In contrast, those from minority, non-Western religions, religiosity may be a barrier to acculturalisation (Kogan et al., 2020).

Previous research on religion and the religiosity of immigrants has produced some conflicting findings. In some cases, migrants have been found to exhibit increased strength of religion and attendance of religious services, while others have become less connected to their religious beliefs (Schreiter, 2009; Vishkin & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022). Increases in religiosity and attendance of religious service among newly arrived migrants has been attributed to a strategy of identity maintenance and protection, with religious communities offering support and familiarity which can help migrants form social connections and preserve cultural identities associated with their country of origin (Frederiks & Nagy, 2016). In contrast, declining religiosity may occur for those who move to more secular contexts; strength of religion and religious observance may weaken over time as a result of assimilation and as religion becomes less salient as a marker of an individual's identity (Molteni & Van Tubergen, 2022). It is important to note that these outcomes are not necessarily mutually exclusive but rather may be influenced by time since arrival. Previous research suggests that increased religiosity and engagement occur shortly following arrival in the host country when migrants may feel the greatest need for support and seek familiarity within a new cultural context (Batuwanthudawa and Udayanga, 2025). This increase may then be followed by a decline driven by adaptation and a change in the importance of religion on identity within a more secular society. This pattern of increasing religious observance, followed by a decline has been observed for migrants in several European countries; however, there has been differences found between religious groups (Khoudja, 2022; Muñoz-Comet & Fleischmann, 2025).

Migrants whose religious identities are a minority within the host country (Batuwanthudawa & Udayanga, 2025), may experience a distinct pattern in religious observance following arrival, with the process of migration potentially having a disruptive effect on religiosity. In these cases religious observance declines in the years following migration compared to pre-migration levels (Wuthnow &

Christiano, 1979; Diehl & Koenig, 2013; Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2013). The likelihood of disruption can depend on a number of factors including the proportion of co-religionists or fellow migrants (Mocanu & Bibiri, 2025), and provision of places of worship.

When considering religiosity among the children of migrants, assimilation and adaptation theories assume that the religiosity of migrant descendants would converge with natives across subsequent generations. There has been some support for this convergence theory; Guveli & Platt (2023) showed that while the children of migrants were less religious than their parents, reported religiosity remained higher than that of the native population. Other studies have also demonstrated a trend of secularisation among migrant descendants (Jacob, 2020; Simsek & Phalet, 2024), although results have been mixed, with the likelihood of intergenerational religiosity decline varying by religion and migrant background. Studies which have compared the religiosity of the second-generation by background have found that minority status significantly effects religiosity, with those belonging to minority groups less likely to experience a decline in religiosity compared to those from majority (usually Christian) groups. This trend was predominantly found among Muslim groups but was also observed for minority Christian denominations (Molteni & Van Tubergen, 2022; Jacob & Kalter, 2013; Diehl & Koenig, 2009).

Political Participation

Engagement with political processes is an essential feature of a successful democracy, with the participation of citizens necessary for democratic states to function (Hooghe et al., 2014; Verba et al., 1995). The political attitudes, participation and engagement can also be understood through the framework of socialisation and adaptation. Most literature posits that childhood is a key life stage for developing political interest, affiliation and behaviour which will influence future participation and engagement (Brubaker, 2001; Neundorf et al., 2013; Salado et al., 2022). This may be particularly important when considering political engagement among migrant communities. Political systems and democratic freedom vary significantly across countries; this means that migrants will likely be socialised with in political contexts which differ from those in the host society. Consequently, migrants socialised in countries with fewer democratic freedoms may have limited or negative experiences of political participation which shapes their attitudes of political institutions and democratic values.

Although childhood is highlighted as a critical period where political attitudes and values are formed, political socialisation has also been found to be an ongoing process whereby values can change when exposed to new environments (Gülzau et al., 2025; Neundorf, 2010). Therefore, adaptation may play an important role. Previous research has demonstrated that migrants' political attitudes do evolve over time following migration and exposure to the society's political context. While some differences between migrants from authoritarian regimes and the majority population persisted, migrants were found to demonstrate high levels of support for democratic values (Gülzau et al., 2025; Bilodeau et al., 2010; Fuchs, 2023). This suggests that while early socialisation may be important with regards to forming political views and behaviour, it is possible for migrants to adapt to new political contexts.

Migrants' political attitudes and behaviour are also shaped by length of time spent in the country. Although previous studies have found that newly arrived migrants tend to report higher levels of trust and satisfaction in the political institutions of the host country (Aksoy et al., 2025; Voicu & Tufiş, 2017), these become less positive over time and they begin to converge with the attitudes of natives (Adman & Strömblad, 2015). This trend has been attributed to the 'Dual Frame of Reference Effect' which describes the way in which migrants compare their living conditions and governmental institutions in

the host country to those in their country of origin. While natives may not hold high opinions of these institutions, migrants may see them as better than the situation they left behind (Sbaa et al., 2025). Migrants from countries where political representatives are seen as weak or untrustworthy may also hold lower expectations which are exceeded by the political environment in the host country (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). In both cases comparisons between country of origin and host country can result in higher levels of institutional trust and satisfaction compared to natives. While country of origin may be a particularly salient reference in the initial years following migration, as time spent in the host country increases, country of origin may weaken as a frame of reference resulting in diminishing levels of trust. Trust can also fade over time as a result of disappointment. Warren (2009) explains that high levels of trust can lead to disappointment when politicians and institutions fall short of expectations or perceived standards. Should this occur, satisfaction and trust can be lost.

Migrant participation in politics and the democratic process is seen as a key indicator of a wider social integration (De Rooij, 2012; Kim & Seltzer, 2024; Munro, 2008). Despite evidence that migrants may adapt to new political contexts, this may not necessarily translate into high levels of engagement (Dollmann, 2022). Factors such as language barriers, lack of familiarity with the political system and social alienation have all be used to explain lower political participation among migrants groups (Ortensi & Riniolo, 2020). While these factors may initially result in lower levels of participation, as migrants integrate into the host society through interactions with governmental institutions and forming social relationships, these barriers may diminish. When focusing on the role of citizenship in migrants political participation, Just & Anderson (2012) demonstrated that migrants who have acquired citizenship of the host country are more likely to participate in both formal and informal political activities. Moreover, increased informal participation was found to be most profound among migrants who originated from less democratic countries. This suggests that despite early socialisation, migrants appear to adapt to new political environments. Heightened participation among those who become citizens also suggests a high degree of assimilation and investment in the host country.

2. Data and Methods

2.1 European Social Survey

This study uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Established in 2001, the ESS is a cross-national survey covering over thirty nations across Europe. The survey is cross sectional in design, with face-to-face interviews taking place every two years with new participants selected for each round. Each round represents a randomly selected, representative sample of the residential population of each participant country aged 15 and over. Each round includes over 200 questions to cover social and political attitudes, and demographic characteristics (ESS, 2023). While most questions are considered ‘core topics’ and are included in every round of the survey, the ESS also includes a number of rotating modules which appear in selected rounds. These rotating modules feature questions related to wellbeing, democracy, age and ageism, and welfare (ESS, 2024).

While thirty-one countries have participated in the ESS at least once, analysis in this report focuses on the fifteen countries that participated in all eleven rounds. These countries represent nations from across European regions; Northern Europe (Sweden, Norway, Finland, UK and Ireland), Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, France and Switzerland), Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary,

Slovenia), and Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal). For further details please see Table A1 in the appendix.

2.2 Sample Age Structure

In our analysis, we consider the age structure of the sample of each country. For our full analytical sample, participants ages range from 15 to 101, with a mean age of 48. Overall, each of the three wider age groups: 15-39, 40-59 and 60+ form one-third of the total. However, there is significant variation across countries. The share of the oldest group is slightly higher in some country samples such as Finland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK and lower in Belgium, Norway, Poland and Spain. It is thus important to adjust all results to different age composition of samples. Further details regarding age distribution of the sample population can be found in the appendix (Table A2).

This report compares migrant generations, exploring the feelings of identity and belonging for individuals who were born overseas, those with migrant family background and those with no migrant family background. The ESS allows us to identify these migrant groups, with the inclusion of variables recording both the country of birth of the respondent and their parents. We distinguish the following groups: The native population consist of individuals who were born in the study country to two native-born parents; immigrants or foreign-born individuals who arrived as adults (1G), those who came as children (1.5G), the descendants of immigrants with two immigrant parents (2G) and those with one immigrant parent (2.5G). In this study, we will focus on the largest population subgroups: the native population, immigrants ('1G' includes both 1G and 1.5G) and their descendants ('2G' includes both 2G and 2.5G). We also disaggregate migrants based upon time since arrival, comparing those who arrived within 10 years to those who have lived in the country for more than 10 years.

Across the countries included in the ESS, the proportion of migrants varies substantially. Poland has the smallest proportion of migrants and their descendants (5%), while Switzerland has the largest (37%). As expected, the share of migrants is largest in Western Europe and smallest in Eastern Europe (see Table A3 in the appendix).

2.3 Time since Arrival for Migrants

Our analysis also compares migrants based upon time since arrival in the host country. Time since arrival is defined using the "How long ago did you first come to live in the country" variable in rounds 2, 3 and 4, and the "What year did you first come to live in the country" variable included in rounds 5-11. Responses to these questions were used to construct migrant groups, those who had lived in the country for less than 10 years and those who had lived in the country for 10 years or more.

2.4 Country Case Studies

In addition to a broad analysis of migrant generations, we also focus on specific migrant groups in three countries with the largest migrant populations: Germany, France, and the UK. A full break down of countries in each migrant origin group can be found in Tables A5 to A7 in the appendix.

2.5 Variables

In this study, we examine three main topics related to the experiences and attitudes of migrants and their descendants. These cover feelings of identity and belonging, perceptions of discrimination, and finally political attitudes and engagement. For each of these topics, we explore a range of variables.

Identity and Belonging

Based on the literature on migrant identity and feelings of belonging we analyse a series of variables. We first examine self-reported religiosity. We explore changes in strength of religion over time and across generations, testing the theories of adaptation and socialisation. Based on previous studies, we may expect that over time for migrants' religiosity will weaken; their descendants may have religiosity scores more similar to natives. Should socialisation within religious migrant families be important, results may also show elevated levels of religiosity across all migrant groups.

We also study feelings of life satisfaction. Should newly arrived migrants face challenges navigating their new cultural context and identity negotiation, life satisfaction may be lower in the years immediately after migration but increase as migrants acculturate into the host society. In contrast, drawing on the dual frame of reference effect, some migrant groups may feel that their lives have improved compared to their pre-migration circumstances. If this is the case, we may expect that their initial life satisfaction is higher compared to natives with convergence across time and generations. We also examine trust in others.

Discrimination

Next, we focus on migrants' perceptions of discrimination. We study whether migrants from particular backgrounds are more likely to report feelings of discrimination than others which helps us better understand differences in social identities and political attitudes. We examine whether migrants feel they are members of a group that they feel would be discriminated against. We also study the likelihood of reporting instances of specific forms of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity and language.

Political Attitudes and Engagement

Finally, we study political attitudes and engagement. We examine feelings of trust respondents have in their country's parliament and feelings of satisfaction in the country's democracy. Based on past research, we expect trust and satisfaction levels to exceed that of the native population and descendants but for scores to decline as length of residence increases. We also examine formal political participation in the form of voting in national elections. We limit our sample to respondents who are eligible to vote and are citizens of their country.

2.6 Methods

We use descriptive statistics to examine the distribution of responses by each migrant group. Majority of the variables included in this study are measured using 11-point Likert scales (values from 0 to 10), those related to political participation and discrimination produce binary (Yes/No) responses. Given the nature of a response variable, we either calculate the mean of the variable or proportions. We adjust both mean and proportions to individual age and wave. We use linear regression and binary logistic regression, accordingly. The descriptive statistics are thus adjusted to possible age differences across migrant groups and countries and survey waves. We also calculated adjusted median for ordinal variables using quantile regression; the results did not differ from those obtained using linear regression. As the measures of social identities and political participation vary considerably by country, we standardise differences between generations, focusing on the difference in average scores between migrants and descendants, and natives. In presented results, values on the x axis which refer to 'Difference from Natives' therefore refer to variation in mean scores e.g. a value of 1 would indicate

that the mean score of a particular group was 1 point higher compared to the mean score of natives on a 0-10 scale. Similarly, a value of -0.5 would indicate that mean scores were half a point lower than the mean native score. Tables detailing the estimated means and probabilities for each model can be found in Tables A8-A16 in the appendix.

3. Results

3.1 Identity and Belonging

3.1.1 Religiosity

Figure 1 shows that religiosity varies significantly across countries included in this analysis. We find that mean religiosity score is highest in Poland followed by Portugal, Ireland and Finland and lowest in Sweden. When looking at how religiosity varies by migrant group within these countries, we find that newly arrived migrants consistently report the highest levels of religiosity, regardless of country-wide mean religiosity score. General trends suggest that over time spent in the country and across generations, religiosity declines with scores becoming more similar to natives. While more established migrants and descendants report lower religiosity scores compared to newly arrived migrants, in several countries, scores remain higher than that of the native population.



Figure 1: Mean Religiosity Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey round 1-11, authors' analysis

In order to focus on religiosity patterns by migrant background, we separately analysed religiosity scores for three countries. We find that across all migrant groups and generations mean religiosity scores exceed those of natives; however, the magnitude of the difference varies by country of origin. European and Western migrants are the most similar to natives in all three countries. In France, results show that African migrants had the highest mean religiosity scores, around four points higher compared to natives. This compares to a 1.3 point difference between natives and European migrants. Across all migrant groups, scores of descendants fell between those of migrants and the native population.

In the UK, Pakistani/Bangladeshi group have the highest mean religiosity scores, followed by Africans, Indians and Caribbeans. While most descendants have lower religiosity than migrants, for the Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups, we observe no difference between 1G and 2G. In Germany, we also see that scores of migrants are higher than that of the native population across all origin groups; however, compared to France and the UK, the religiosity levels of the descendants of migrants are more similar to the native population. We also find smaller generational differences, with no significant difference observed between migrants and descendants for the MENA, Turkish, and Rest of Europe groups.



Figure 2: Mean Religiosity Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

3.1.2 Life Satisfaction

Figure 3 shows life satisfaction scores by country and migrant generation. At the country level, we see that levels for satisfaction vary, with the highest satisfaction scores in Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Sweden and the lowest scores in Portugal and Hungary. We find that life satisfaction does appear to vary by migrant group; however, patterns differ across countries. Portugal is the only country in the sample where all migrant groups had higher mean scores compared to the native population. This is likely due to relatively low overall mean life satisfaction scores for the country. Despite higher life satisfaction scores among newly arrived migrants in Slovenia, no difference was found between more established migrants and 2G compared to the native population.

In several countries, we found a modest but statistically significant difference, with migrant groups reporting lower levels of life satisfaction than natives. In Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands and Norway, scores for both 1G groups, and 2G were lower than those for natives. Interestingly, these countries were also found to have the highest country level mean life satisfaction scores, suggesting high levels of life satisfaction among the native population.



Figure 3: Mean Life Satisfaction Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

Of countries where migrants scored lower than natives, we only find generational differences in the Netherlands where the descendants reported higher levels of life satisfaction compared to migrants. Germany showed similar patterns, with newly arrived migrants having lower mean life satisfaction

scores than 2G. The UK is the only country where 2G reported lower levels of life satisfaction compared to newly arrived migrants.

In our case study countries, we find that life satisfaction of migrants varies by country of origin (Figure 4). In France and the UK, we observe that migrants from European and Western countries have high life satisfaction scores compared to the native population. Their descendants had lower scores and were similar to natives. In France, migrants from Africa had the lowest levels of life satisfaction, with mean scores around 0.7 points lower than that of the native population. Migrants from the Maghreb also reported lower levels of life satisfaction compared to natives, but higher than African migrants.

In Germany, we find that life satisfaction scores were lowest for Turkish and Asian migrants, those from MENA and ex-USSR countries also scored slightly lower than the native population. There were no differences between the descendant groups and natives (with the exception of the Other category). Eastern European and other European (non-former USSR) migrants exhibited higher levels of life satisfaction compared to Asian and Turkish migrants. In the UK, we find few differences between migrant groups: higher levels of life satisfaction for European and Western migrants, and lower levels of life satisfaction among African migrants and the descendants of Caribbean migrants.



Figure 4: Mean Life Satisfaction Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

3.1.3 Trust in Others

Our final model on the identity and belonging topic focuses on trust in others in society. We find that trust in others is highest in Norway and Finland and lowest in Portugal and Poland (Figure 5). As with life satisfaction, we see that differences in trustfulness across migrant generations vary by country. In Belgium, we find a unique pattern where trust in others appears to decline across time spent in the country and between generations. While no difference was found between natives and newly arrived migrants, mean trust scores for the second generation were around 0.6 points lower, with the scores of more established migrants falling in between.

Higher levels of trust among newly arrived migrants were also observed in the UK, with migrants who had arrived within the last ten years demonstrating higher trust scores compared to more established migrants, descendants and the native population. In contrast, we find that in Sweden trust scores were highest for 2G and natives, while both 1G groups reported lower levels of trust. Generational patterns were less pronounced in other countries; however, we do find differences between migrant groups and the native population. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, all migrant groups were found to have lower mean trust scores compared to natives. Again, these countries had relatively high mean country level scores. In some countries such as Ireland, France and Spain, no significant differences were found between natives and any migrant group, with both 1G and 2G groups reporting similar levels of trust as the native population.



Figure 5: Mean Trustfulness Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

When examining feelings of trust towards others by migrant origin, we see that in the UK and France, 1G European and Western migrants had higher scores compared to natives and other migrant groups (Figure 6). This was not found for the second generation whose scores were more similar to those of natives. In Germany, we see the largest difference between natives and people of Turkish origin, with both 1G and 2G reporting lower levels of trust. Overall, we find that Turkish migrants had a mean trust score of 1 point lower than that of the native population. Lower levels of trust were also observed for Eastern European migrants; however, these differences are small compared to the Turkish group. Our analysis of migrant groups in France found little difference in trust score by country background, no significant differences were found between natives and any descendant group. As well as higher trust levels among European migrants, we also find lower levels of trust for the African group. In the UK, migrants from India had also relatively high level of trust, whereas those from the Caribbean region had low level.



Figure 6: Mean Trustfulness Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis
Adjusted for age and ESS Round

3.2 Political Attitudes and Participation

3.2.1 Trust in Parliament

Figure 7 shows the mean score of feeling of trust in the country's parliament. Overall, we see, that Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland had the highest scores, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia had the lowest. When we compare the trust scores by migrant generation, we find that migrants had higher levels of trust compared to their descendants who showed trust levels similar to that of the native population. The only exceptions were found in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, where average trust scores were lower for 2G compared to the native population. When comparing migrants based upon the time since their arrival, we see in several countries more recently arrived migrants reporting higher trust scores compared to those who have lived in the country for 10 years or more. We observe the largest gap between migrants and the native population in the UK, with newly arrived migrants having an average trust score of more than 1.5 points higher than natives. Interestingly, in countries with the highest levels of trust, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, we see smaller gaps between migrant groups and natives, with no significant difference found between older migrant groups, descendants and the native population.



Figure 7: Trust in Country's Parliament Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

Our country level analysis supports that most migrants have higher levels of trust in parliament than the native population; the descendants of migrants have trust scores similar to those of natives (Figure 8). In France, there is little difference between migrants, whereas there are some group differences in the UK. We see that levels of trust are higher among Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants compared to those from the Caribbean region and Europe and the West. We also find some variation between the trust scores of descendants, with people of African and Indian origin showing higher levels of trust than the native population. Finally, we find that Caribbean migrants had the lowest levels of trust in the UK parliament compared to other migrant groups and Caribbeans were the only group where no difference was found between migrants and the native population. In Germany, the MENA group was found to have the highest levels of trust, with a mean score of around 1.2 points higher than natives. Descendants of Asian migrants were the only descendant group who reported higher levels of trust in the German parliament compared to the native population.



Figure 8: Mean Trust in Parliament Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

3.2.2 Satisfaction with Democracy

Next, we explored differences in the levels of satisfaction individuals had in the state of their country's democracy. Again, we see variation across countries, with median satisfaction scores higher in Switzerland and the Nordic countries and the lowest in Slovenia, Hungary and Portugal (Figure 9). We find clear differences across migrant groups, with average satisfaction scores highest for newly arrived migrants and established migrants being between newly arrived, and natives and descendants. We again find that the group differences are smallest in countries with the highest levels of satisfaction.



Figure 9: Satisfaction with Country's Democracy Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

Scores for satisfaction with the country's democracy closely resemble patterns of the trust in parliament for our three case study countries. In France, we find that all migrant groups reported higher levels of satisfaction than their descendants and the native population, with no differences found between natives and 2G groups. In the UK, migrants were found to report higher levels of satisfaction across all groups with the exception of Caribbeans whose scores did not significantly differ from the native population. While most descendant groups had similar scores to natives, scores for those of African origin were higher than natives. In Germany, satisfaction scores were again higher for all migrants compared to the native population, with migrants from MENA countries having the highest levels of satisfaction. There was little variation found by country of origin for other groups. All descendant groups were found to have scores as high or higher than natives, with individuals of Turkish descent, the (Rest of) Europe and Asia all reporting higher levels of trust than the native population.



Figure 10: Mean Satisfaction in Democracy Scores Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

3.2.3 Likelihood of Voting Among Eligible Citizens

Figure 11 shows differences in the probability of having voted at the last national election. When looking at voting behaviour by country, we can see that there is variation across European countries, with individuals in Belgium and Sweden both having the highest likelihood of participation (over 90%). We see that in the majority of countries; migrants were less likely to have voted compared to the native population. The gap between migrants and natives appears to be highest in Ireland, while we found no differences in the likelihood of voting in Hungary, Poland and the UK. Results are more mixed for descendants: a lower likelihood of voting in countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and Slovenia, while there were no differences between natives and 2G in Norway, Finland, Spain and Sweden. Hungary is the only country where the likelihood of voting was higher for descendants than the native population.



Figure 11: Likelihood of Voting in the Last Election Relative to Natives, by Migrant Group

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

We find some interesting differences in the likelihood of voting by country of origin. Across all three countries most migrant groups are less likely to have voted at the previous election compared to the native population (Figure 12). In France, both migrants from Maghreb and their descendants are less likely to vote compared to natives, while no difference was found for migrants from Africa or Europe. Results are more mixed in Germany and the UK. In Germany, we find that migrants from the former USSR were the least likely to vote, 20 per cent points less likely to vote than the native population. We do see a convergence to the levels of natives for their descendants. A similar pattern is found for Eastern Europeans; however, the gap between 1G and 2G is less pronounced. We observe the opposite trend for people of Turkish origin. While Turkish migrants are as likely to vote as natives, their descendants have a lower likelihood of voting. No differences are found between African migrants and the native population.

In the UK, we find that only European and Western, and Caribbean migrants are less likely to vote compared to the native population, with all other migrant groups as likely to vote as natives. Among the second generation all groups are as likely to vote as natives with the exception of the people of Indian origin who are slightly more likely to vote than the native population. European and Western migrants are the only group where we see some generational differences, with the second generation more likely to vote than the first generation.



Figure 12: Likelihood of Voting in Last Election Relative to Natives, by Migrant Background and Generation in Three European Countries

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

3.3 Discrimination

In the final section, we focus on perceptions and reported discrimination among immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and the UK. We explore how feelings of discrimination vary by migrant background. We first explore the individuals' likelihood of identifying as part of a group which is discriminated against in the country; we then study the likelihood of reporting instances of discrimination based upon religion, language or ethnicity. Figure 13 shows the likelihood of experiencing discrimination in Germany. We see from the 'All' chart that Turkish migrants and their descendants were the most likely to identify as a discriminated against group, followed by those from MENA countries. Those from Asia and other countries were also more likely to identify as a discriminated against group. Analysis suggests that migrants from Europe were the least discriminated group. We see some interesting generational differences. For individuals from the former USSR, we find that while the first generation were slightly more likely to feel they are part of a discriminated against group, this was not the case for their descendants. This differs from other migrant groups where both migrant and their descendants are equally likely to identify as a member of a discriminated against group.

We explore specific types of discrimination in more detail. We find that Turkish migrants were most likely to report instances of discrimination based upon religion. This group was around 25 per cent points more likely to report discrimination based upon religion compared to those from the Rest of Europe (reference group). While Turkish migrants and their descendants were also more likely to report discrimination based upon language and ethnicity compared to the Rest of Europe group, the difference was smaller than the gap observed for religious discrimination. We find similar patterns for migrants from MENA countries; however, differences were less pronounced compared to Turkish migrants. Interestingly, the descendants of Turkish migrants were the only group of descendants who were more likely to experience language-based discrimination.

While we only find small differences between Ex-USSR migrants and the descendants from the Rest of Europe, migrants from the former USSR appear to be more likely to experience discrimination based upon language or ethnicity. No difference was found in the likelihood of experiencing religious discrimination. Interestingly, higher levels of discrimination reported by Ex-USSR group was only observed for the first generation. Finally, Asian migrants and their descendants report slightly higher discrimination than the 2G Rest of Europe group across all categories, but there is no evidence that the Asian group is more likely to experience discrimination associated with any specific characteristic.



Figure 13: Likelihood of Reporting Discrimination among by Migrant Background in Germany (Relative to 2G Rest of Europe Group)

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

In France, we see that all groups were more likely to identify being part of a discriminated against group compared to European migrants and their descendants. Again, when we explore specific reports of discrimination, we see only small differences between migrant groups in most cases. Migrants from the Maghreb region and their descendants were the most likely to report discrimination based upon religion and ethnicity. Discrimination based upon language was the only result where we find slightly higher levels of discrimination for all migrant groups, including Europeans. We also find that descendant groups were no more likely to experience discrimination based upon language compared to their European counterparts.



Figure 14: Likelihood of Reporting Discrimination among by Migrant Background in France (Relative to 2G Europe Group)

Adjusted for age and ESS Round

Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

* 2G African group excluded due to small sample size

Our findings from the UK differ from the patterns observed in two other countries. When looking at whether individuals felt they were a member of a group discriminated against, most descendants were more likely to respond 'yes' compared to 2G European and Western group; however, such a difference was not found for all migrant groups. The gap between migrants and their descendants is largest for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi group. While both migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh and their descendants were more likely to identify as a member of a discriminated against group, the descendants were found to have a higher likelihood than migrants. No generational differences were observed for any other group. However, we also find that while Caribbean and Indian migrants were no more likely to identify as discriminated against than descendants of European and Western migrants, the descendants of Caribbean and Indian migrants were. African migrants were the only group in this analysis where both 1G and 2G were more likely to see themselves as part of a discriminated group compared to the descendants of European and Western migrants.

Feelings of discrimination appear to be driven by religion for Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents, with both migrants and descendants most likely to report having experienced religious discrimination. Again, descendants were more likely to have reported this type of discrimination compared to migrants. African migrants were also slightly more likely to experience religious discrimination compared to other groups but less likely compared to the descendants of Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants. Across other migrant groups, we find no elevated risk of religious discrimination compared to European and Western descendants. We find that all groups (both migrants and descendants) with ethnic minority status (Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Caribbean, and African) were more likely to report discrimination based upon ethnicity compared to European and Western groups. We find little evidence of language discrimination for any migrant or descendant group. This may be due to migrant groups originating from countries with strong colonial links to the UK and English as a commonly spoken language around the world.



Figure 15: Likelihood of Reporting Discrimination among by Migrant Background in UK (Relative to 2G European & Western Group)

Adjusted for age and ESS Round
Source: European Social Survey, authors' analysis

* Caribbean and 2G Other Group missing due to low sample size

4. Discussion

This report investigated social identities and political participation amongst migrants and descendants in Europe. We explored these issues using a range of variables included in the European Social Survey and compared newly arrived migrants, more established migrants, and descendants to the native population in fifteen countries. We also examined three case study countries with large and diverse migrant population: France, Germany and the UK. This analysis allowed us to disaggregate migrants and their descendant by country of origin.

We observed some evidence of adaptation in relation to both identity and political attitudes. Feelings of religiosity, trust in parliament, and satisfaction with democracy all appear to converge with those of the native population with length of time spent in the country and across generations. We found that newly arrived migrants show higher levels trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy compared to natives and descendants; however, this declines with the duration of residence; scores for descendants were similar to those of the native population in many cases.

Despite higher levels of trust and satisfaction, migrants' higher satisfaction with democracy and trust in government do not translate into their voting behaviour or informal political engagement. This could be for a number of reasons such as difficulties in navigating the new system, the intention to leave the country or the feeling that they should leave voting to people who are more knowledgeable about the country's affairs. However, it could also be explained by a possible discrepancy between migrants' faith in their new country and between the harsh realities and discrimination that they face. This is certainly an area where policies could help promote migrant integration and a common sense of belonging given that most migrants have high willingness to integrate expressed by their faith in their new country.

Although we observed that religiosity scores also converged with those of the native population, the patterns differ from those found for political attitudes. Analysis showed that scores among more established migrants and descendants were lower than newly arrived migrants, but remained higher than those of the native population in many countries. This may suggest that as religiosity forms a key part of an individual's identity, it is retained following migration and passed through generations. In contrast, political attitudes are relative and context dependant, they are therefore more malleable and can change in response to increasing knowledge of the political system or as country of origin becomes a less salient frame of reference.

Findings from our analysis of case study countries showed that this trend of elevated religiosity among descendants does not occur across all migrant groups. We observed that for Turkish groups in Germany and Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups in the UK, religiosity scores for descendants were as high as those for migrants. Interestingly, these same groups were most likely to identify as a discriminated against group and report instances of religious based discrimination. This suggests that for these groups, religion is an important component of their identity. As a result, these groups may also be more observant and practicing, e.g. attending religious services or wearing religious garments, this may make them more vulnerable to discrimination based upon religion.

Our analysis also explored feelings of life satisfaction. Our results showed that in countries with high overall levels of life satisfaction migrants and their descendants had lower satisfaction scores. In contrast, higher satisfaction scores (in relative terms) were found in countries with lower levels of overall satisfaction. We also found that life satisfaction scores appear to vary by country of origin.

While European and Western migrants reported satisfaction scores as high or higher than natives, in France and Germany, most non-European groups scored their life satisfaction lower than the native population. This may suggest that challenges associated with migration results in lower levels of life satisfaction among migrants from countries which are more culturally different. Although the challenges of acculturalisation may impact upon life satisfaction, discrimination experienced by these groups may also influence how these groups evaluate their quality of life. In France and Germany, the groups found to have lower levels of life satisfaction were also those most likely to identify as a member of a discriminated against group and have lower levels of trust in others in society. These three factors may be closely linked, with experiences of discrimination influencing both life satisfaction and trustfulness. The relationship between these three variables and how they vary across migrant groups deserves of further attention in order to avoid marginalisation amongst migrants who, overall, have high willingness to integrate.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Countries Participating in Each ESS Round

Table A1: Country Participation by ESS Round[1]

"+" denotes a country's participation, and "-" non-participation

	ESS Round											
Country	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**Total**
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	1,183
Austria	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	17,386
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	18,945
Bulgaria	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	15,417
Croatia	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	7,937
Cyprus	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	6,671
Czech Republic	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	19,833
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	12,380
Estonia	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	16,760
Finland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	21,092
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	20,765
Germany	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	36,020
Greece	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	15,217
Hungary	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	18,655
Iceland	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	4,799
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	23,943
Israel	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	16,683
Italy	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	12,880
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	1,294
Latvia	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	5,083
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	12,885
Luxembourg	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,126
Montenegro	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	4,030
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	19,991
North Macedonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	1,405
Norway	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	17,325
Poland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	18,959
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	19,219
Romania	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,069
Russia	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	12,381

[1] Please note that country totals may differ from totals in analytical sample. Analytical sample excludes individuals with missing data regarding date of birth, country of birth or parents' country of birth.

Serbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	4,966
Slovakia	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	12,500
Slovenia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	14,613
Spain	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	21,218
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	19,385
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	18,253
Turkey	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,239
Ukraine	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	9,937
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	22,450
TOTAL	41,954	47,132	42,628	56,379	52,197	54,420	40,000	44,153	49,223	58,079	45,729	531,894

Source: European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, Authors' analysis.

Appendix 2: Detailed Age Distribution by Country

Table A2: Sample Size by Country and Age Group

	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60+	Total
Belgium	1,210	1,499	1,313	1,349	1,540	1,639	1,613	1,688	1,575	5,435	18,861
Finland	1,109	1,253	1,434	1,478	1,515	1,587	1,560	1,767	1,917	7,408	21,028
France	864	1,123	1,221	1,503	1,817	1,695	1,715	1,795	1,797	7,080	20,610
Germany	1,914	2,311	2,203	2,383	2,688	2,915	3,093	3,410	3,226	11,646	35,789
Hungary	795	1,225	1,274	1,381	1,499	1,502	1,660	1,559	1,560	6,085	18,540
Ireland	853	1,394	1,610	1,941	2,330	2,232	1,958	1,896	2,012	7,611	23,837
Netherlands	749	988	1,212	1,450	1,714	1,827	1,765	1,811	1,774	6,668	19,958
Norway	993	1,248	1,167	1,396	1,521	1,600	1,654	1,570	1,527	4,629	17,305
Poland	1,268	1,672	1,577	1,566	1,479	1,508	1,492	1,569	1,553	5,172	18,856
Portugal	664	1,048	1,079	1,347	1,457	1,457	1,434	1,468	1,546	7,639	19,139
Slovenia	812	1,068	1,077	1,002	1,053	1,209	1,193	1,257	1,259	4,566	14,496
Spain	1,070	1,424	1,491	1,731	1,887	1,990	1,994	1,825	1,621	6,122	21,155
Sweden	991	1,236	1,309	1,401	1,519	1,555	1,426	1,529	1,599	6,731	19,296
Switzerland	832	1,096	1,182	1,422	1,605	1,738	1,628	1,552	1,529	5,603	18,187
United Kingdom	690	1,039	1,367	1,757	1,933	1,911	1,822	1,758	1,811	8,241	22,329
Total	14,814	19,624	20,516	23,107	25,557	26,365	26,007	26,454	26,306	100,636	309,386

Source: European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, Authors' analysis.

Appendix 3: Detailed Distribution of Migrant Generations by Country

Table A3: Sample Size by Country and Migrant Generation

	Native	1G	2G	Total
Belgium	14,730	2,271	1,860	18,861
Finland	19,861	777	390	21,028
France	16,103	2,094	2,413	20,610
Germany	29,149	3,475	3,165	35,789
Hungary	17,615	347	578	18,540
Ireland	19,485	3,381	971	23,837
Netherlands	16,786	1,755	1,417	19,958
Norway	14,804	1,652	849	17,305
Poland	17,997	192	667	18,856
Portugal	17,216	1,455	468	19,139
Slovenia	11,881	1,310	1,305	14,496
Spain	18,608	2,117	430	21,155
Sweden	15,311	2,294	1,691	19,296
Switzerland	11,433	4,212	2,542	18,187
United Kingdom	17,913	2,640	1,776	22,329
Total	258,892	29,972	20,522	309,386

Source: European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, Authors' analysis.

Appendix 4: Age Distribution by Gender

Table A4: Sample Size by Age and Gender

	Male	Female	Total	Male %	Female %	Total %
15-19	7,398	7,413	14,811	49.9%	50.1%	100%
20-24	9,837	9,781	19,618	50.1%	49.9%	100%
25-29	9,821	10,685	20,506	47.9%	52.1%	100%
30-34	11,060	12,041	23,101	47.9%	52.1%	100%
35-39	12,154	13,399	25,553	47.6%	52.4%	100%
40-44	12,448	13,911	26,359	47.2%	52.8%	100%
45-49	12,385	13,614	25,999	47.6%	52.4%	100%
50-54	12,553	13,892	26,445	47.5%	52.5%	100%
55-59	12,547	13,743	26,290	47.7%	52.3%	100%
60+	46,601	53,905	100,506	46.4%	53.6%	100%
Total	146,804	162,384	309,188			

Source: European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, Authors' analysis.

Appendix 5: Country of Origin and Migrant Group Categorisation

Table A5: Country of Origin Coding – Germany

Migrant Group	Country of Origin
MENA	North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen
Ex-USSR	USSR, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Lativa, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Turkey	Turkey
Asia	Central Asia, Western Asia, Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Pakistan, Vietnam
Eastern Europe	Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Kosovo, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro
Rest of Europe	Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden

Table A6: Country of Origin Coding – France

Migrant Group	Country of Origin
Maghreb	Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
Europe	Yugoslavia, Andorra, Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Switzerland, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, UK, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Lativa, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro North Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro
Africa	Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, DRC, CAR, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Comoros, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad, Togo, Mayotte, South Africa

Table A7: Country of Origin Coding – UK

Migrant Group	Country of Origin
Europe and West	Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Western Europe, Czechoslovakia, Southern Europe, Albania, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Slovakia, Ukraine, USA, Yugoslavia
India	India
Pakistan/Bangladesh	Pakistan, Bangladesh
Caribbean	Caribbean, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago
African	Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Angola, Botswana, DRC, CAR, Congo Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Appendix 6: Estimated Mean Scores – All Countries

Table A8: Religiosity – All Countries

Religiosity				
	Native	**1G < 10 years**	**1G 10+ years**	**2G**
Belgium	4.30	7.00	6.14	5.24
	(4.26-4.35)	(6.78-7.22)	(6-6.27)	(5.11-5.37)
Finland	4.96	5.96	5.36	4.85
	(4.92-5)	(5.63-6.3)	(5.11-5.62)	(4.57-5.13)
France	3.86	7.06	5.91	4.83
	(3.81-3.9)	(6.77-7.35)	(5.78-6.05)	(4.71-4.94)
Germany	3.74	5.40	5.07	4.39
	(3.71-3.77)	(5.21-5.59)	(4.96-5.18)	(4.29-4.49)
Hungary	4.15	5.99	5.02	4.11
	(4.1-4.19)	(5.34-6.64)	(4.68-5.36)	(3.87-4.34)
Ireland	5.30	5.84	4.81	4.65
	(5.26-5.34)	(5.69-5.99)	(4.68-4.94)	(4.47-4.83)
Netherlands	4.31	6.39	5.84	4.91
	(4.27-4.36)	(6.09-6.7)	(5.69-5.99)	(4.76-5.06)
Norway	3.62	5.19	4.34	3.80
	(3.57-3.67)	(4.95-5.42)	(4.16-4.51)	(3.61-4)
Poland	6.29	6.17	6.13	5.96
	(6.24-6.33)	(4.41-7.93)	(5.7-6.55)	(5.75-6.18)
Portugal	5.37	6.79	5.69	5.21
	(5.33-5.41)	(6.53-7.04)	(5.5-5.87)	(4.95-5.47)
Slovenia	4.69	7.14	4.88	4.46
	(4.63-4.74)	(6.7-7.57)	(4.71-5.05)	(4.3-4.62)
Spain	4.19	6.31	5.36	4.09
	(4.15-4.23)	(6.13-6.49)	(5.19-5.52)	(3.82-4.36)
Sweden	3.06	5.27	3.95	3.34
	(3.02-3.11)	(5.01-5.52)	(3.82-4.09)	(3.2-3.48)
Switzerland	4.89	5.27	5.42	4.99
	(4.84-4.95)	(5.1-5.44)	(5.32-5.52)	(4.87-5.1)
UK	3.55	6.11	5.24	4.48
	(3.51-3.59)	(5.92-6.3)	(5.11-5.38)	(4.35-4.62)

Table A9: Life Satisfaction – All Countries

Life Satisfaction				
	Native	**1G < 10 years**	**1G 10+ years**	**2G**
Belgium	7.53	7.29	7.18	7.18
	(7.5-7.57)	(7.14-7.45)	(7.08-7.28)	(7.09-7.27)
Finland	8.00	7.56	7.75	8.03
	(7.97-8.03)	(7.32-7.79)	(7.57-7.93)	(7.83-8.23)
France	6.49	6.26	6.49	6.39
	(6.46-6.53)	(6.06-6.46)	(6.39-6.58)	(6.31-6.47)
Germany	7.18	6.89	7.14	7.12
	(7.15-7.2)	(6.76-7.03)	(7.06-7.21)	(7.05-7.19)
Hungary	5.92	6.53	6.08	5.74
	(5.89-5.95)	(6.07-6.99)	(5.84-6.32)	(5.58-5.91)
Ireland	7.17	7.09	7.16	7.11
	(7.14-7.2)	(6.99-7.2)	(7.07-7.25)	(6.98-7.23)
Netherland	7.75	7.20	7.34	7.61
	(7.72-7.78)	(6.99-7.42)	(7.24-7.45)	(7.51-7.72)
Norway	7.91	7.71	7.72	7.71
	(7.87-7.94)	(7.55-7.88)	(7.6-7.84)	(7.58-7.85)
Poland	6.69	6.94	6.77	6.71
	(6.66-6.72)	(5.76-8.12)	(6.47-7.06)	(6.55-6.86)
Portugal	5.99	6.46	6.20	6.27
	(5.96-6.02)	(6.28-6.64)	(6.07-6.33)	(6.09-6.45)
Slovenia	7.01	7.60	7.07	7.01
	(6.97-7.04)	(7.29-7.9)	(6.95-7.18)	(6.9-7.12)
Spain	7.17	6.94	6.92	7.15
	(7.14-7.2)	(6.81-7.06)	(6.8-7.03)	(6.96-7.34)
Sweden	7.86	7.57	7.57	7.72
	(7.83-7.89)	(7.39-7.75)	(7.47-7.66)	(7.62-7.82)
Switzerland	8.22	7.89	7.80	7.99
	(8.19-8.26)	(7.77-8.01)	(7.72-7.87)	(7.91-8.07)
UK	7.14	7.24	7.14	6.96
	(7.11-7.17)	(7.11-7.37)	(7.05-7.24)	(6.87-7.05)

Table A10: Trust in Others – All Countries

Trust in Others				
	Native	**1G < 10 years**	**1G 10+ years**	**2G**
Belgium	5.18	5.19	4.92	4.60
	(5.15-5.22)	(5.01-5.36)	(4.81-5.03)	(4.5-4.7)
Finland	6.67	6.29	6.47	6.55
	(6.64-6.7)	(6.03-6.55)	(6.27-6.67)	(6.33-6.77)
France	4.53	4.54	4.59	4.44
	(4.5-4.56)	(4.31-4.76)	(4.48-4.69)	(4.36-4.53)
Germany	4.94	4.82	4.81	4.72
	(4.92-4.97)	(4.68-4.97)	(4.73-4.9)	(4.64-4.79)
Hungary	4.41	4.78	4.64	4.45
	(4.37-4.44)	(4.28-5.29)	(4.37-4.91)	(4.27-4.63)
Ireland	5.39	5.39	5.36	5.45
	(5.36-5.43)	(5.27-5.51)	(5.26-5.46)	(5.31-5.59)
Netherlands	6.05	5.69	5.50	5.71
	(6.02-6.09)	(5.45-5.93)	(5.38-5.62)	(5.6-5.83)
Norway	6.77	6.39	6.31	6.64
	(6.73-6.8)	(6.21-6.58)	(6.18-6.45)	(6.48-6.79)
Poland	3.90	5.16	4.22	4.03
	(3.87-3.94)	(3.84-6.48)	(3.9-4.55)	(3.86-4.2)
Portugal	3.88	4.31	4.16	4.06
	(3.85-3.91)	(4.12-4.51)	(4.02-4.3)	(3.85-4.26)
Slovenia	4.31	4.23	4.01	4.30
	(4.27-4.35)	(3.89-4.57)	(3.88-4.14)	(4.18-4.42)
Spain	4.96	4.86	4.91	4.81
	(4.93-4.99)	(4.72-5)	(4.77-5.04)	(4.6-5.03)
Sweden	6.22	5.68	5.73	6.12
	(6.18-6.25)	(5.48-5.88)	(5.63-5.84)	(6.02-6.23)
Switzerland	5.92	5.67	5.42	5.62
	(5.88-5.96)	(5.54-5.81)	(5.34-5.49)	(5.54-5.71)
UK	5.27	5.65	5.28	5.28
	(5.24-5.3)	(5.51-5.8)	(5.18-5.39)	(5.17-5.38)

Table A11 Trust in Country's Parliament – All Countries

Trust in Country's Parliament				
	Native	**1G < 10 years**	**1G 10+ years**	**2G**
Belgium	4.73	5.55	5.11	4.55
	(4.69-4.77)	(5.37-5.74)	(4.99-5.23)	(4.44-4.66)
Finland	5.93	6.40	5.93	5.87
	(5.9-5.96)	(6.12-6.68)	(5.72-6.14)	(5.63-6.1)
France	4.2	5.09	4.63	4.08
	(4.17-4.25)	(4.85-5.34)	(4.52-4.75)	(3.98-4.17)
Germany	4.68	5.42	5.05	4.64
	(4.65-4.71)	(5.26-5.59)	(4.96-5.15)	(4.55-4.72)
Hungary	4.10	5.27	4.68	4.09
	(4.07-4.14)	(4.71-5.82)	(4.39-4.96)	(3.89-4.28)
Ireland	4.26	5.20	4.43	4.36
	(4.23-4.3)	(5.06-5.34)	(4.32-4.54)	(4.21-4.51)
Netherlands	5.36	5.69	5.29	5.22
	(5.32-5.4)	(5.43-5.96)	(5.17-5.41)	(5.09-5.34)
Norway	6.17	6.59	6.30	6.24
	(6.14-6.21)	(6.39-6.78)	(6.16-6.44)	(6.08-6.4)
Poland	3.14	3.27	3.11	3.07
	(3.11-3.18)	(1.89-4.65)	(2.76-3.46)	(2.89-3.25)
Portugal	3.64	4.37	4.11	3.71
	(3.6-3.67)	(4.16-4.59)	(3.96-4.26)	(3.5-3.93)
Slovenia	3.66	4.58	3.88	3.60
	(3.62-3.71)	(4.21-4.95)	(3.74-4.02)	(3.47-3.73)
Spain	4.23	5.37	4.76	4.17
	(4.2-4.26)	(5.22-5.53)	(4.62-4.9)	(3.94-4.4)
Sweden	5.92	6.38	5.82	5.84
	(5.88-5.95)	(6.16-6.59)	(5.71-5.93)	(5.73-5.95)
Switzerland	5.91	6.55	6.37	5.93
	(5.87-5.95)	(6.39-6.7)	(6.28-6.46)	(5.84-6.03)
UK	4.14	5.83	4.89	4.20
	(4.1-4.17)	(5.67-5.99)	(4.77-5)	(4.09-4.31)

Table A12: Satisfaction with Country's Democracy – All Countries

Satisfaction with Country's Democracy				
	Native	**1G < 10 years**	**1G 10+ years**	**2G**
Belgium	5.34	6.49	5.92	5.31
	(5.3-5.38)	(6.31-6.67)	(5.81-6.03)	(5.2-5.41)
Finland	6.54	7.35	6.89	6.49
	(6.5-6.57)	(7.08-7.63)	(6.69-7.1)	(6.26-6.72)
France	4.49	5.86	5.3	4.54
	(4.46-4.53)	(5.53-6.09)	(5.19-5.41)	(4.45-4.63)
Germany	5.46	6.69	6.03	5.53
	(5.43-5.48)	(6.53-6.84)	(5.94-6.12)	(5.45-5.61)
Hungary	4.31	5.93	5.01	4.21
	(4.28-4.34)	(5.41-6.45)	(4.73-5.28)	(4.03-4.4)
Ireland	5.31	6.47	5.57	5.13
	(5.28-5.34)	(6.34-6.59)	(5.46-5.67)	(4.99-5.28)
Netherlands	6.07	6.81	6.12	6.02
	(6.04-6.11)	(6.56-7.06)	(6-6.24)	(5.9-6.14)
Norway	6.85	7.62	7.17	6.93
	(6.82-6.89)	(7.43-7.8)	(7.03-7.31)	(6.78-7.09)
Poland	4.52	4.34	4.73	4.5
	(4.49-4.56)	(1.94-5.74)	(4.39-5.08)	(4.33-4.68)
Portugal	4.21	5.6	4.8	4.3
	(4.18-4.25)	(5.39-5.8)	(4.66-4.96)	(4.04-4.47)
Slovenia	4.06	5.73	4.64	4.02
	(4.02-4.1)	(5.38-6.09)	(4.5-4.77)	(3.9-4.15)
Spain	4.95	6.36	5.53	4.83
	(4.92-4.98)	(6.22-6.51)	(5.4-5.67)	(4.61-5.04)
Sweden	6.4	7.24	6.68	6.45
	(6.36-6.43)	(7.03-7.45)	(6.57-6.78)	(6.34-6.56)
Switzerland	6.99	7.65	7.42	7.09
	(6.94-7.03)	(7.51-7.8)	(7.34-7.5)	(7.00-7.18)
UK	4.94	6.65	5.68	4.95
	(4.9-4.97)	(6.5-6.81)	(5.57-5.79)	(4.85-5.06)

Table A13: Likelihood of Voting

Country	Native	1G	2G
Belgium	0.93	0.85	0.91
	(0.93–0.94)	(0.83–0.87)	(0.90–0.93)
Finland	0.84	0.74	0.81
	(0.83–0.84)	(0.70–0.78)	(0.76–0.85)
France	0.73	0.66	0.68
	(0.72–0.73)	(0.63–0.68)	(0.66–0.70)
Germany	0.87	0.74	0.84
	(0.86–0.87)	(0.72–0.76)	(0.83–0.86)
Hungary	0.76	0.78	0.81
	(0.76–0.77)	(0.74–0.83)	(0.78–0.84)
Ireland	0.82	0.68	0.78
	(0.82–0.83)	(0.66–0.70)	(0.76–0.81)
Netherlands	0.86	0.73	0.8
	(0.85–0.86)	(0.70–0.75)	(0.78–0.82)
Norway	0.89	0.8	0.9
	(0.89–0.90)	(0.77–0.83)	(0.88–0.92)
Poland	0.74	0.75	0.75
	(0.73–0.74)	(0.69–0.82)	(0.71–0.78)
Portugal	0.74	0.64	0.69
	(0.74–0.75)	(0.61–0.67)	(0.64–0.73)
Slovenia	0.76	0.69	0.69
	(0.75–0.77)	(0.67–0.72)	(0.67–0.72)
Spain	0.83	0.72	0.8
	(0.83–0.84)	(0.68–0.75)	(0.76–0.84)
Sweden	0.94	0.84	0.92
	(0.93–0.94)	(0.82–0.85)	(0.90–0.93)
Switzerland	0.71	0.6	0.66
	(0.70–0.72)	(0.57–0.62)	(0.64–0.68)
UK	0.74	0.72	0.76
	(0.73–0.74)	(0.70–0.74)	(0.74–0.78)

Appendix 7: Estimated Means: Case Study Areas

Table A14: Estimated Means and Probabilities for Political Outcomes – Case Study Areas

Germany									
	Trust in country's Parliament			Satisfaction in Democracy			Likelihood of Voting[2]		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native German	4.76	4.73	4.79	5.55	5.52	5.58	0.87	0.87	0.88
1G MENA	5.99	5.67	6.31	7.21	6.89	7.53	0.78	0.70	0.86
1G Ex-USSR	4.95	4.77	5.13	5.94	5.76	6.12	0.69	0.65	0.72
1G Eastern Europe	5.23	5.07	5.39	6.17	6.01	6.33	0.78	0.75	0.82
1G Turkey	5.04	4.74	5.34	6.21	5.91	6.50	0.83	0.76	0.90
1G Rest Europe	5.12	4.89	5.35	6.19	5.96	6.42	0.77	0.69	0.85
1G Asia	5.54	5.17	5.91	6.64	6.27	7.00	0.65	0.53	0.77
1G Africa	5.44	4.87	6.00	7.09	6.52	7.65	0.86	0.71	1.01
1G Other	5.49	5.06	5.92	6.64	6.21	7.08	0.86	0.74	0.97
2G MENA	4.26	3.70	4.81	5.57	5.03	6.11	0.80	0.71	0.90
2G Ex-USSR	4.63	4.34	4.93	5.63	5.33	5.92	0.83	0.78	0.88
2G Eastern Europe	4.67	4.54	4.79	5.44	5.31	5.57	0.86	0.84	0.88
2G Turkey	4.67	4.40	4.95	5.89	5.62	6.17	0.77	0.71	0.82
2G Rest Europe	4.79	4.60	4.99	5.82	5.62	6.01	0.85	0.82	0.88
2G Asia	5.30	4.83	5.77	6.07	5.60	6.55	0.74	0.65	0.84
2G Other	4.12	3.81	4.42	5.33	5.02	5.64	0.81	0.76	0.87

France									
	Trust in country's Parliament			Satisfaction in Democracy			Likelihood of Voting		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native French	4.18	4.14	4.22	4.46	4.42	4.50	0.73	0.73	0.74
1G Maghreb	4.83	4.65	5.02	5.49	5.30	5.68	0.67	0.62	0.71
1G Europe	4.53	4.34	4.72	5.17	4.98	5.37	0.70	0.64	0.76
1G Africa	5.00	4.73	5.26	5.86	5.59	6.13	0.67	0.60	0.75
1G Other	4.96	4.65	5.27	5.71	5.40	6.02	0.59	0.50	0.67
2G Maghreb	3.98	3.81	4.16	4.46	4.29	4.64	0.66	0.62	0.69
2G Europe	4.08	3.95	4.21	4.52	4.39	4.65	0.71	0.69	0.74
2G Africa	4.04	3.63	4.44	4.29	3.88	4.70	0.65	0.56	0.73
2G Other	4.37	3.99	4.75	4.74	4.35	5.12	0.61	0.53	0.69

[2] Likelihood of Voting column shows predicted probabilities rather than mean score

UK									
	Trust in country's Parliament			Satisfaction in Democracy			Likelihood of Voting		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native British	4.04	4.01	4.08	4.9	4.86	4.93	0.75	0.74	0.75
1G Europe & West	4.87	4.7	5.04	5.76	5.6	5.93	0.65	0.59	0.7
1G Indian	5.88	5.55	6.2	6.65	6.33	6.97	0.82	0.76	0.88
1G PAK/BGD	5.86	5.49	6.24	6.2	5.83	6.58	0.85	0.8	0.9
1G African	5.33	5.07	5.58	6.12	5.86	6.37	0.73	0.67	0.78
1G Caribbean	4.22	3.7	4.73	5.27	4.75	5.79	0.58	0.48	0.69
1G Other	5.72	5.43	6.02	6.62	6.33	6.91	0.71	0.64	0.78
2G Europe & West	4.02	3.86	4.18	4.93	4.77	5.09	0.76	0.73	0.79
2G Indian	4.54	4.17	4.92	5.22	4.85	5.6	0.84	0.79	0.89
2G PAK/BGD	4.27	3.84	4.7	4.99	4.56	5.42	0.81	0.75	0.87
2G African	4.78	4.32	5.23	5.63	5.18	6.08	0.79	0.72	0.86
2G Caribbean	3.86	3.47	4.26	4.53	4.13	4.92	0.7	0.63	0.77
2G Other	4.4	3.84	4.96	4.97	4.41	5.52	0.76	0.66	0.85

Table A15: Mean Scores of Identity and Belonging Variables – Case Study Areas

Germany									
	Trust in Others			Life Satisfaction			Religiosity Margins		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native German	4.97	4.94	4.99	7.22	7.19	7.24	3.70	3.66	3.73
1G MENA	4.61	4.31	4.91	6.92	6.65	7.19	5.82	5.44	6.20
1G Ex-USSR	4.95	4.78	5.12	7.03	6.87	7.18	4.63	4.42	4.85
1G Eastern Europe	4.75	4.59	4.90	7.28	7.14	7.42	5.12	4.93	5.31
1G Turkey	4.37	4.09	4.66	6.75	6.49	7.00	6.03	5.68	6.39
1G Rest Europe	5.06	4.84	5.28	7.31	7.11	7.51	4.45	4.17	4.73
1G Asia	4.85	4.50	5.19	6.78	6.47	7.10	5.33	4.90	5.77
1G Africa	4.22	3.68	4.75	6.73	6.24	7.21	7.28	6.61	7.96
1G Other	5.43	5.01	5.85	7.09	6.71	7.47	4.75	4.23	5.28
2G MENA	4.58	4.05	5.10	6.78	6.31	7.26	5.17	4.51	5.83
2G Ex-USSR	4.89	4.60	5.18	7.13	6.87	7.39	4.04	3.68	4.40
2G Eastern Europe	4.86	4.73	4.98	7.17	7.06	7.29	3.94	3.78	4.10
2G Turkey	3.88	3.62	4.15	7.05	6.81	7.29	6.16	5.83	6.49
2G Rest Europe	4.90	4.71	5.08	7.28	7.12	7.45	4.19	3.96	4.43
2G Asia	4.58	4.12	5.04	7.11	6.70	7.53	4.28	3.71	4.86
2G Other	4.61	4.31	4.90	6.85	6.59	7.12	4.37	4.00	4.75

France									
	Trust in Others			Life Satisfaction			Religiosity Margins		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native French	4.53	4.50	4.57	6.49	6.45	6.53	3.90	3.85	3.95
1G Maghreb	4.57	4.40	4.74	6.25	6.06	6.44	6.54	6.29	6.78
1G Europe	4.78	4.60	4.95	6.82	6.63	7.01	5.22	4.97	5.47
1G Africa	4.21	3.97	4.45	5.79	5.53	6.04	7.86	7.51	8.20
1G Other	4.63	4.35	4.91	6.66	6.35	6.96	6.45	6.04	6.85
2G Maghreb	4.44	4.27	4.60	6.31	6.13	6.48	5.49	5.26	5.72
2G Europe	4.48	4.36	4.61	6.46	6.33	6.59	4.32	4.14	4.49
2G Africa	4.34	3.97	4.70	6.07	5.68	6.47	6.18	5.65	6.70
2G Other	4.48	4.14	4.82	6.53	6.16	6.90	5.47	4.97	5.96

UK									
	Trust in Others			Life Satisfaction			Religiosity Margins		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
Native British	5.31	5.27	5.34	7.15	7.12	7.18	3.59	3.55	3.63
1G Europe & West	5.62	5.47	5.77	7.37	7.23	7.51	4.88	4.68	5.07
1G Indian	5.68	5.39	5.97	7.16	6.88	7.43	6.52	6.14	6.89
1G PAK/BGD	5.40	5.07	5.73	7.34	7.03	7.65	7.59	7.16	8.01
1G African	5.11	4.88	5.34	6.88	6.66	7.10	6.86	6.56	7.16
1G Caribbean	4.45	3.98	4.92	6.77	6.33	7.22	6.37	5.76	6.97
1G Other	5.80	5.54	6.06	7.27	7.02	7.52	5.58	5.24	5.92
2G Europe & West	5.37	5.23	5.52	7.05	6.92	7.19	4.14	3.95	4.33
2G Indian	5.34	5.01	5.68	7.26	6.95	7.58	4.98	4.55	5.41
2G PAK/BGD	5.08	4.70	5.47	6.84	6.47	7.20	7.11	6.61	7.61
2G African	5.12	4.71	5.53	6.88	6.49	7.26	5.33	4.79	5.86
2G Caribbean	5.12	4.76	5.48	6.57	6.23	6.90	4.53	4.07	4.98
2G Other	5.55	5.04	6.05	6.95	6.47	7.43	4.86	4.20	5.51

Appendix 8: Discrimination Tables

Table A1: Likelihood of Discrimination – Case Study Areas

Germany												
	ALL			Ethnicity			Language			Religion		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
1G MENA	0.23	0.18	0.28	0.06	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.16
1G Ex-USSR	0.18	0.15	0.20	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.03
1G Eastern Europe	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03
1G Turkey	0.38	0.32	0.43	0.08	0.05	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.16	0.26	0.21	0.31
1G Rest Europe	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02
1G Asia	0.23	0.18	0.29	0.10	0.06	0.13	0.08	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.11
1G Other	0.30	0.24	0.36	0.06	0.03	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.03	0.01	0.06
2G MENA	0.32	0.22	0.41	0.07	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.14	0.08	0.21
2G Ex-USSR	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03
2G Eastern Europe	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
2G Turkey	0.35	0.30	0.40	0.10	0.07	0.14	0.10	0.07	0.14	0.21	0.17	0.26
2G Rest Europe	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
2G Asia	0.21	0.14	0.28	0.07	0.03	0.12	0.06	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.09
2G Other	0.18	0.14	0.23	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04

France												
	ALL			Ethnicity			Language			Religion		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
1G Maghreb	0.26	0.23	0.30	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.09	0.14
1G Europe	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04
1G Africa	0.33	0.28	0.38	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.05
1G Other	0.24	0.19	0.29	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.04
2G Maghreb	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.07	0.11
2G Europe	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02
2G Africa	0.31	0.24	0.39	0.06	0.02	0.09	*	*	*	0.07	0.03	0.10
2G Other	0.21	0.15	0.27	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.08

UK												
	ALL			Ethnicity			Language			Religion		
	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI	Margin	Lower CI	Upper CI
1G Europe & West	0.16	0.13	0.18	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.03
1G Indian	0.17	0.12	0.22	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.08
1G PAK/BGD	0.19	0.13	0.25	0.06	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.15	0.09	0.20
1G African	0.27	0.22	0.32	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.11
1G Caribbean	0.25	0.15	0.35	0.08	0.01	0.15	*	*	*	0.01	-0.01	0.04
1G Other	0.18	0.13	0.22	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.07
2G Europe & West	0.16	0.14	0.19	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.05
2G Indian	0.23	0.17	0.30	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.11
2G PAK/BGD	0.43	0.34	0.51	0.15	0.09	0.21	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.31	0.23	0.40
2G African	0.35	0.26	0.44	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.16
2G Caribbean	0.36	0.29	0.44	0.09	0.04	0.13	*	*	*	0.07	0.03	0.11
2G Other	0.21	0.12	0.31	0.02	-0.01	0.06	*	*	*	0.01	-0.01	0.04